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GRAMC Presentation - Monthly Roundtable

FICC Podcasts 03 mai 2022
FICC Podcasts 03 mai 2022

 

Disponible en anglais seulement.

Margaret Kerins along with Dan Krieter and Ben Jeffery from BMO’s FICC Macro Strategy Team discuss the main themes impacting rates and credit at BMO Capital Markets’ Global Reserve Managers Conference on May 3, 2022.


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About Macro Horizons
BMO's Fixed Income, Currencies, and Commodities (FICC) Macro Strategy group led by Margaret Kerins and other special guests provide weekly and monthly updates on the FICC markets through three Macro Horizons channels; US Rates - The Week Ahead, Monthly Roundtable and High Quality Credit Spreads.

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Margaret Kerins:

This is Macro Horizons, monthly episode 40. This is recording from our Macro Horizon session presented on May 3rd at BMO Capital Markets, Global Reserve Asset Managers Conference. Each month members from BMO's FICC Macro strategy team join me for a round table, focusing on relevant and timely topics that impact our markets. Please feel free to reach out on Bloomberg or email me at Margaret.Kerins@bmo.com with questions, comments, or topics you would like to hear more about on future episodes. We value your input and appreciate your ideas and suggestions. Thanks for joining us.

Speaker 2:

The views expressed here are those of the participants and not those of BMO Capital Markets, it's affiliates or subsidiaries.

Margaret Kerins:

Good morning, and thank you for coming to our conference this year, and especially coming to our panel discussion today. My name is Margaret Kerins and I head up our FICC Macro strategy team here at BMO Capital Markets. I'm joined by two wonderful members of my team, Ben Jeffrey and Dan Krieter. And today we are going to talk about the markets. We are going to focus on the US. So I recently passed a milestone in April 25 years in FICC strategy. I had been a bank examiner for several years beforehand. So over the past 25 years always the optimist. I looked back in my career and I thought, Okay, we had the Asian financial crisis. We had the Russian default and long term capital management. We had 9/11 and everything that followed that with fiscal stimulus and checks being written out in monetary policy easing. Of course the great financial crisis that lasted quite some time. And the recovery took so long.

Margaret Kerins:

And just when we think we're out of the water and the Fed has raised rates and things are going good, a global pandemic. I mean, who knew? Who could plan this? And of course now the war with Russia and the Ukraine. So, and when I look through the past 25 years in my career, I thought navigating crisis is actually the norm. And we think about the volatility that we've had in the markets, and what's driven this volatility. It's been quite extraordinary. It's basically been one great big sort of black swan event after another like, oh, this. Let's deal with this. So when we think about what we're going through now, of course we've seen incredible volatility in an unprecedented way due to circumstances we haven't seen before. Which seems to be the norm, dealing with circumstances we haven't seen before.

Margaret Kerins:

So what is really different, I think this time than we've had in the past is we do have a much better understanding of the Fed's reaction function. And you think back 25 years ago, the saying used to be during the Fed meeting "Oh, I wish I was a fly in the wall, the green room, and I could know what that conversation was." And Doug's laughing, you know what I'm talking about? The room used to be green, that they met in at the FOMC. I don't know what color it is now, and nobody cares, but we didn't have press conferences after each meeting until recently. And so the amount of information that we are able to understand about the Fed's reaction function has grown dramatically. Another main factor is real time data. 20 years ago, we had to wait. Back in the day, we would actually mail out our research, our strategy on a Friday afternoon, hoping people would get it by Sunday and read it by Monday morning.

Margaret Kerins:

And the whole process took so long. We didn't have the financial data even on GDP as quickly as we do now. So, so much more information in the marketplace that we, as a market can understand and sort of trade as the Fed is also absorbing the same market. Another thing that's greatly different is that the Fed had contained inflation. They had stuck that inflation genie into the bottle, and there was presumably no way they were going to disrupt the credibility on inflation and that allowed the curve to remain flat. Even when the Fed was raising rates back to the old green span conundrum, how could they raise rates so much in tens and thirties barely moved. And it was really credibility about inflation fighting. And of course the global backdrop is reserve money increased due to the global economy. And there was greater demand for US Treasuries.

Margaret Kerins:

So the market was understanding all of this and able to price it. And of course, in 2012, the Fed came out and said, "Listen, we're going to target 2% inflation and really put a hard number on it." And that was the first time we'd seen that. Yes, of course we all knew it was 2%, but it was the first time that they sort of had that optimal policy number on it. So fast forward, I love it when we fast forward a decade or more, but let's fast forward to August of 2020 when the Fed decided to change its operating policy. And of course they were going to allow the prior shortfalls and inflation to catch up a little bit. Let's let inflation run a little bit above 2% in order to target full and inclusive employment. So this was August 2020, we can look back now of course and say, "Great timing."

Margaret Kerins:

But clearly we are now in a situation where the Fed is behind the curve. So the Fed had been in before this whole episode, of course, they had been preemptive. They looked forward to what inflation would be and they would say, "Okay, we're going to fight tomorrow's inflation with today's interest rate policy." Now we're in a situation, were there fighting yesterday's inflation and today's inflation with literally tomorrow's interest rate policy. And so I think it's clear they're behind the curve. They are messaging that they're going to move rates rapidly up. And the implication is different this time, because we do have inflation. It might be different for the curve. We think it's going to be different for the way that growth reacts to the Fed, especially in an inflationary backdrop, where there could be massive demand destruction in a very rapid way.

Margaret Kerins:

So with that, I'm going to pass it to Ben Jeffrey, who is part of our institutional investor, number one ranked US rates team. Ben, during these volatile times and periods we haven't seen or volatility, we haven't seen it in some time. How should we be thinking about interest rates and the shape of the curve in this backdrop?

Ben Jeffery:

Yeah. Thanks Margaret and everyone again. Thanks for coming. I do think Margaret touched on something about just how fast everything is. We get economic data very fast. We get market data very fast. We can text each other almost instantly. I think speed is probably the main hallmark of this monetary policy cycle. The speed of the recovery, the speed of the economic moves we've seen, and probably most notably the speed of inflation has translated to a Fed that is acting in a way that we have not seen probably since the 1970s. We think a 50 basis point rate hike is coming tomorrow. We haven't seen one of those since 2000. And it's that speed, I think that is really kind of begging the question. What is not just tomorrow's meeting, not just June's meeting, but what is the rest of the monetary policy cycle going to look like? And what is the rest of the interest rate cycle going to look like?

Ben Jeffery:

If in fact the Fed is going to get to whatever their penciling in is terminal the SEP is shown us 2.8. It'll probably be a little bit higher than that. If we're going to reach that level by the middle part of next year, it took us three years to get to terminal during the last cycle. We got one hike, an entire calendar year on hold, and then a steady quarterly 25 basis point March. Up until that terminal rate that ultimately proved too restrictive. So if it took three months to get just to 250 last cycle, and now we're going to be testing 3%, maybe even above 3%, this cycle in a far more condensed timeline. The question to me is how long are we going to be able to keep rates at what by most estimates are in restrictive territory. Middle 2023 policies tight.

Ben Jeffery:

We're already starting to see risk assets come under pressure. We're already starting to see the beginnings of a tighter monetary policy impact on growth on the demand side of the equation. As the question was asked earlier, supplies going to remain an issue, but demand is already starting to come under pressure. So will the Fed really be able to keep rates very tight for an extended period of time or as with so many aspects of the cycle? Will the speed dynamic also play out into how long we stay on hold? Historically terminal only lasts about six to nine months, maybe slightly longer than that in some examples. So if we're already talking about terminal in the second quarter, maybe the third quarter of 2023, when do rate cuts need to start to enter the conversation? When does an easier monetary policy bias need to start entering the conversation?

Ben Jeffery:

I don't think it's easy policy, but I think something back toward what might be neutral around that, 200 to 250 level could make a lot more sense in maybe 18 months from now. The performance of the economy and I think the underlying strength of the consumer, some of that excess savings that we've seen built up, I don't think that necessarily is going to pretend a dramatic recession or anything like that, that cut back to the lower bound, massive re-steepening of the curve. But remember back in 2019, after we reach terminal at 250 and late 2018, we saw the S &P 500 enter a bear market. And very, very quickly the FOMC came out and said, "We're done hiking. We went too far. Policy is too tight. So we're going to have a period on hold." And that period on hold ultimately lasted until July of 2019.

Ben Jeffery:

And it was at that point, we got those three fine tuning rate cuts, brought policy back down to a level that frankly might have been appropriate. And the market may have been comfortable with had we not encountered the pandemic and obviously everything that's followed. So the speed of that cycle, the speed of everything that's played out, lead us to believe that the curves going to remain flat. We've gotten inversion in two tens and five thirties. We're not expecting substantial inversions down to previous cycles extremes, but more a yield curve environment sort of chopping around zero. 10 year yields reach 3% yesterday.

Ben Jeffery:

So a very flat yield curve right around that 3% level seems to be the path of least resistance over the next several months. As the Fed has shown us that they're going to be willing to continue on willing to tighten until something breaks. And that's kind of been our core tenant throughout every monetary policy cycle we've seen. The Fed is going to hike until the market, until the economy performs in such a way that they're no longer able to hike. So hiking until something breaks, I think is a good opportunity for Dan to jump in on the areas of focus. The wobbles that might start to appear, maybe are already appear.

Dan Krieter:

Yeah, Ben you've certainly... I've heard you use that term before until something breaks. And the difficult part obviously is trying to time when something is going to break. But when you say, when something breaks, what are we talking about here? We're talking most likely about growth/earnings and pricing of financial assets. And perhaps that's why we've seen a lot more focus from market participants now on growth concerns potentially going forward. Participation rates in the US at least are getting very close to where they were pre-pandemic. But what strikes me about the participation rate is the relationship we've seen since the pandemic, between wage inflation and the participation rate. They've both grown together very strongly. That's a departure from the historical experience between the two, obviously as the supply of labor grows, the price of that labor should fall. And that's what we've seen historically, a negative 80% correlation between the two, which makes sense historically.

Dan Krieter:

But since the pandemic they've been strongly positively correlated and I'll make the argument that, that can't last forever, right? At some point, the participation rate rises to a point where the labor shortage is cured and wage inflation levels off or more likely from where we sit now, the participation rate will reach levels that are consistent with anyone who wants a job has one. And then wage inflation should skyrocket, which could very easily happen. For me the most important thing though, is that in either of those scenarios, the outlook for consumption, isn't very good. You talk about a positive correlation between part rate and wage inflation. I'll make the argument, that's pretty much a perfect environment for growth.

Dan Krieter:

The consumer is strong. He's getting more wages that translates to high demand, but prices are, well going up. They're somewhat manageable because we're seeing more workers enter into the workforce that keeps labor prices, at least somewhat contained. If the power rate level's off and we see no more workers coming back, wage inflation is going to go up, which just feeds through to higher prices in something akin to a wage price spiral. And then we get to questions of what's real wage growth. It's been negative. Could it be even more negative? And that paints a pretty bleak picture for consumption.

Margaret Kerins:

Yeah. So I think Dan, you raised some interesting points. A 1% change in the part rate translates into about 2.6 million jobs. So 1% increase, 2.6 million jobs. We've got almost twice as many job openings as people that are seeking employment. To me, that means there's a mismatch in the skillset of what employers are looking for relative to what's out there. And that doesn't resolve itself overnight, right? If it was a perfect skillset match, these jobs would be filled basically is what I'm saying. And then if we do get an increase in the part rate, you'll get 2.6 million more people coming in and hopefully those jobs will match, but that's hope and a prayer. It's not the greatest way to run economic policy for the Fed. One of the things I find interesting is that chair Powell has sort of taken the cover under this sort of job market situation.

Margaret Kerins:

We've got all these excess jobs. So I being the Fed, I can raise rates quite rapidly. Well in the perfect environment then I guess it means that all of those excess jobs just kind of go away and that calms things down, but really is that what happens or do actual people that are employed get laid off and no longer have jobs. And that starts to crush demand. The fact is the Fed wants to decrease demand. Well, how do you decrease demand? Well, you do it by raising interest rates and making credit more expensive, raising interest rates on the front end of course increases the price of auto loans. It increases the price of credit card debt, and it makes just buying on credit, more expensive for the regular household. Increasing interest rates on the long end has a different impact because that impacts the housing market.

Margaret Kerins:

So at the same time, they're choking off demand because of the tight labor market. They do want the unemployment rate to increase a little bit, right? They want some of the slack or the tightness to come out of the labor market. So in their perfect world, again, they would like it to be all those excess jobs and everybody to keep on working, but that's not the way it happens. And so for us, this could get pretty messy quick because of the speed that they're moving at. And that's one thing that we're very, very aware of and conscious of when we're making our interest rate decisions. And this kind of comes up to the question that we get, will the Fed sell their mortgage back securities portfolio. Now of course, tomorrow we will get the announcement on running down the Treasury portfolio.

Margaret Kerins:

Back at Jackson hole last year in August, there was a paper presented about the benefits of selling assets out of the portfolio. And some of the positives were basically the Fed can be credible about being independent from treasury and not simply financing the debt. They could be credible about fighting inflation. If they were to sell, say, mortgage backed securities out of their portfolio, then they wouldn't have to increase the Fed funds rate as much and choke off the credit to the regular consumer, but they could slow down the housing market with higher mortgage rates. Obviously this was written before mortgage rates rose by hundreds of basis points rapidly over the past, basically couple of weeks. And then the negative of course is its sloppy. You really can't control the market reaction to that. It brings me back to some of the days on the trading desk where we'd have big orders come in and it might be a real big client and they'd be selling a big chunk.

Margaret Kerins:

And the trader would always say, "What's behind it?", right? Because you don't want to be the first guy putting a bid or first person putting a bid on that when there's a whole bunch behind it. And kind of catching the falling knife. And we know what's behind this. It's trillions of dollars, right? So the other part of it on the Treasury side, the argument I guess for is they bought a trillion dollars in Treasuries in March of 2020 alone. And that was really to provide liquidity to market functioning, right? And so the argument is, "Well, we really don't need that trillion anymore because the market's functioning again. So let's get it down by at least that". And in Treasuries, that's certainly doable. Getting the bill portfolio down, that's pretty easy and allowing maturities to run off, isn't that difficult. So it's really going to be about how Treasury decides to refund all of this, right?

Margaret Kerins:

Because right now they're funding it at the interest on reserves, right? It's floating right front end funding rate on trillions of dollars of debt. Now they're going to have to term that out and actually pay an interest rate on it. And that we do think it could get a little messy, but Treasury will likely start with bill issuance and then slowly start terming it out. But there is a big chunk of debt. Now, as Doug said, the fiscal situation has changed. And our economics team, when they pulled out, build back better, it took quite a bit out of the deficit projections and allowed some room for some of this funding. But to put it in perspective base case, right now it's $5 trillion in Treasury issuance, combinations of bills and coops over a three year period. That is more than we had in the prior six years.

Margaret Kerins:

Okay. So if they decide to fund it along the same maturity schedule, as we have now and say 20, 25% in bills, which is a little heavier than we've got now, you're still looking at trillions of dollars of 10 year equivalents coming into the market that need to be absorbed. And I just can't see how the Fed could start selling MBS on top of that. I just can't see it today, anyway. I think they're going to have to fuel their way through this. Wait and see how this first wave goes of tightening and running off the balance sheet to determine if they can actually start reducing that MBS portfolio. One of the biggest impacts though, of course, is on the credit markets and what happens to credit in this type of environment where growth is going to slow down. They want to slow down growth. We've had pretty decent credit markets where the spreads have held in, obviously widened bit, but they're nowhere near the all-time wides. So Dan, how are you looking at the credit market?

Dan Krieter:

Yeah. I mean, I think the question's very well timed because if you look at where we are for a generic 10 year corporation issuing debt today on an all in yield basis, we were about 4.2% last week. That's within range of the highest we've been since the financial crisis. So there is an argument to made that from a corporation standpoint, we're already in restrictive territory and certainly any further increases in the long end or increases in credit spreads is just further and further restriction. And I think this is an extremely important topic to monitor because I think it's potentially underappreciated in the market, just how reliant some of the credit markets have gotten on the Fed over the course of the past decade. Anytime we've seen an appreciable tightening in financial conditions, really since the global financial crisis, we've seen the Fed come riding to the rescue.

Dan Krieter:

We know that is not going to be the case this time. So you can make a pretty compelling argument that we could see the first actual sustained downgrade default cycle since the global financial crisis, as the Fed maintains Hawkish policy into what's likely to be a dimming corporate earnings' perspective. Now in high yield land, that could mean more defaults, recall in high yield land. That's where the quote unquote zombie corporations live, which depending on your definition, as many as one in five US corporations in the high yield market, don't generate enough earnings in a year to cover simply interest expense. These corporations only survived by issuing more debt.

Dan Krieter:

We went and looked at the number of employees, there's as many as two million people working at quote unquote zombie firms. In the investment grade market were talking, not defaults obviously, but potentially a big wave of downgrades where we see more fallen angels and just credit spreads moving wider in anticipation of potentially sustained downgrades and defaults. So for me, the financial condition story is extremely, extremely important. And one saving grace we've had so far is that curves have continued to flatten. Ben, you talked about flattening curves earlier. That's certainly been the theme really for the past year, just curve flattening, but what's the risk that we're wrong here? The market as a whole is wrong. Is there a path to sustainably steeper curves, particularly bear steepening?

Ben Jeffery:

Yeah, I think that's obviously given as with the speed argument made earlier the speed of the curve flattening, and we've already gotten inversion after a single rate hike. That is well known. Well discussed at this point. So what's it going to take to get us to the other side of this? The bull case I think is fast tightening, fast cutting, and that's going to bring a rally across the curve led by the front end. And that gives you your bull steepening back to levels that we saw maybe before the pandemic, but the bare case is a little bit more troubling. And I think the most concerning way we get a materially higher rate complex in a steepening fashion would be if the Fed loses control of inflation expectations. We've seen 10 year breakevens in the tips market move back to 3% this week. It was very interesting. The first time 10 year breakevens touched 3%, that was almost to the day when chair Powell came out and said that maybe a 50 bit rate hike makes sense.

Ben Jeffery:

They are concerned about realized inflation, absolutely, but to Margaret's point earlier, the Fed is not fighting today's inflation. They're not fighting this quarter's inflation. They're fighting the inflation that we're going to be seeing in the later part of this year and early next year. So to contain inflation expectations, they've acted as aggressively as they have. If that comes into further question, whether it be from an efficacy of monetary policy perspective or the supply chain issues that we touched on earlier with food prices, with energy prices, surging to levels not seen in a very, very long time. If the market starts to lose faith in the ability of the Fed to contain the type of inflation we're seeing, I think it's that environment where you could really start to see an ugly decoupling in the long end of the curve and spiraling higher inflation expectations that to the wage price spiral argument earlier, I think is precisely the reason why we've seen them act so aggressively.

Ben Jeffery:

I was having a discussion earlier. The Fed does not typically move in half point increments. The Fed usually likes measured, predictable, regular. It's far more of an emerging market narrative to see a central bank move as aggressively as we're seeing play out. And a big part of that is inflation expectations. The other kind of rosier outlook. I'm not sure Dan's offered a ton of reason for optimism on the rosy side of things just yet, but the other rosier outlook is the soft landing. And I think that if the Fed is able to walk the tight rope that they're trying to walk and we see front end pricing rationalize, maybe they're able to pull off another fine tuning rate cut campaign like what we saw in 2019. We get rates back to neutral. Growth recovers, growth picks up, inflation remains contained, stag inflation worries, and the labor market all hold in.

Ben Jeffery:

It's in that environment where I think we get the front end comparatively better contained. Call it the two to five year sector, whereas the longer end of the curve holds in a maybe not materially higher rate range, but perhaps slightly higher than what we're expecting. Over the rest of this year, we do expect that kind of all these concerns that we're talking about on the growth side, on the consumption side, on the wage side, as well as risk asset performance, we are turning a bit more constructive on the long end of the curve. I think at this point we're nearly fully priced for what we're going to see in terms of a tightening cycle on the front end. So this bear flattening that we've seen, I do think will kind of transition to more of a bullish tone and keep the curve very flat, but in a bullish fashion, as opposed to kind of the bearish one that we've seen play out. And I think an extension of what we've seen play out in terms of inflation expectations is really how we get that concerningly bearer, steeper curve.

Margaret Kerins:

So, Ben, I think you said it really well. Laying out some different scenarios. So after we get this succession of rapid Fed fund increases in a row, do you think there'll be a period of pause where the Fed and the markets digest this and then react to whatever the impact of this Fed action might be on, especially the long end?

Ben Jeffery:

Yep. No, that's a really good question, Margaret. And I think looking historically what we've seen is the front end of the Treasury market really does not like to price in stagnant policy, any terminal. We saw it and I'm continuing to cite the 2019 example, because that's the most recent one. The 2019 example, as soon as the Fed came out and said, "We're on hold", you immediately saw rate cuts start to get priced in. Historically looking in the 2000s, the Fed has not been able to hike rates, hold and evaluate and then begin hiking again.

Ben Jeffery:

And I think that kind of reaction function from the market's perspective means that as soon as we see that messaging something along the lines of "We've delivered a lot of tightening. Now we're going to pause to reassess." That pause to reassess is going to be a very quick bull steepener, I think because as I touched on earlier, periods on hold don't last that long in traditional cycles. This is certainly not a traditional cycle. So a more aggressive kind of faster rally in the front end of the curve in the two year sector, I do think would be a far, faster and far more aggressive steepener than we probably saw in 2019.

Margaret Kerins:

So Ben, you talked about our call for twos, tens and curve wise, the base case, voting round zero, probably popping around 20 basis points. I think we're not consensus for tens. So let's just talk a little bit about where we think tens will end the year and why. And obviously we know where the risks are, but let's.

Ben Jeffery:

No, absolutely. So we came into this year, far more bearish than we typically are. I mean that had a lot to do with what did not end up being transitory inflation combined with what we saw last November with chair Powell, kind of making that hawkish pivot after he received nomination. Not unreasonable to assume that containing inflation soon became priority number one for him. So the hawkishness we saw from the Fed combined with inflation, that was always going to pick up well beyond what was even the most dire expectations led us to look for a very large sell off led by the front end of the Treasury curve but across the curve. Admittedly 10 year yields at 3% stretched a little bit farther than we were expecting it would. But that being said, what we have tended to see in terms of seasonality in treasuries is the first half of the year, generally speaking is bearish.

Ben Jeffery:

Whether it's inflation, whether it was the tax cuts following the 2016 election, there's always a sense of new year, maybe this will be the year. Maybe inflation will be great. Maybe this year will really be the time when the economy makes it off whatever stumbling block it fell upon that bearishness tends to run us to course right around this week, ironically enough, with the mayor refunding announcement and kind of the supply considerations around that. And it's at that point when investors who were waiting for a big increase in yield, investors who have been evaluating how the economic data has played out, take a hard look at their allocations and say, "Well, we've been waiting to get invested at higher yields. We've got higher yields now. So maybe now is the time." And we're already starting to hear talk of this on the trading desk that some larger accounts are starting to move a little bit further out the curve, just given the scale of the repricing that we've seen. A full percentage point increase in 10 year yields is very, very dramatic.

Ben Jeffery:

That dynamic has led us to this point. And some of the concerns that we've been discussing now are leading us to lean a bit more bullishly over the second half of the year. And we're expecting a kind of a slow, steady grind, lower in yields, not back to 2%, but maybe the 2,25, 2,35 level towards the end of the year. We think we could get a bit below that right around the September, October period. But in terms of a year end target, we're looking at that 2,25 to 2,35 level, just as some of these concerns that we've been chatting about to make their way more material into pricing.

Margaret Kerins:

This concludes Macro Horizons, monthly episode 40. Live from our Toronto Global Reserve and Asset Managers Conference. Please feel free to reach out to us with questions and comments and thanks for joining.

Margaret Kerins:

Thanks for listening to Macro Horizons, please visit us at bmocm.com/macrohorizons. We'd like to hear what you thought of today's episode. You can send us an email at Margaret.Kerins@bmo.com. You can listen to the show and subscribe on Apple podcasts or your favorite podcast provider. And we'd appreciate it if you could take a moment to leave us a rating and a review. This show and resources are supported by our team here at BMO, including the FICC Macro strategy group and BMO's marketing team. This show is produced edited by Puddle Creative.

Speaker 2:

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Margaret Kerins, CFA Chef - Stratégie macroéconomique, Titres à revenu fixe
Ian Lyngen, CFA Directeur général et chef, Stratégie de taux des titres en dollars US
Benjamin Reitzes Directeur général, spécialiste en stratégie – taux canadiens et macroéconomie
Greg Anderson Chef mondial, Stratégie de change
Stephen Gallo Chef de la stratégie de change pour l’Europe
Dan Krieter, CFA Directeur, Stratégie sur titres à revenu fixe
Dan Belton Vice-président - Stratégie sur titres à revenu fixe, Ph. D.
Ben Jeffery Spécialiste en stratégie, taux américains, titres à revenu fixe

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